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The commercial functions of a trade mark, unconventional trade marks and 
modern technology 
 
Adam Luke Alexander 
 
E-Mail: u1173423@unimail.hud.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
The paper analyses the current legislation within the UK and Europe with respect to 
trade mark law. A number of legal journals and case reports provide the bulk of 
research material, with use of direct judicial quotes and key opinions of journal 
authors providing the framework for research into the state of current trade mark law. 
The historical functions of trade marks dating back nearly a century are still relevant 
today, with concepts recognised and enshrined by both domestic UK and European 
Union courts. Trade marks work as a badge of origin and, by extension, allow similar 
products to be differentiated. They act as a guarantee of quality and an ambassador 
for the generation and preservation of goodwill that has been generated within a 
given trade mark. Gaining a trade mark confers a near monopoly on its use and the 
legislation provides mechanisms to protect and recognise this. A trade mark allows 
businesses to build identity, quality and reputation into the core essence and 
branding of their products. A diverse quantity of ideas and concepts are capable of 
representation graphically, in both conventional and abstract forms, allowing them to 
be trade marked. The resulting monopoly granted by the trade mark is of exceptional 
importance to businesses of all sizes, allowing them to benefit from the breadth of 
commercial functions that a trade mark can fulfil. Despite the law regularly playing 
catch-up to new technological advances, the courts are applying flexible and 
practical solutions to accommodate the developing needs of modern informational 
technology. 
 
Keywords: Intellectual property; trade marks; unconventional trade marks; Trade 
Marks Act 1994; Directive 2008/95/EC.  
Introduction 
This paper will consider the commercial functions of a trade mark and look at how 
effective the current law is at allowing trade marks to be registered, with a focus on 
unconventional marks. It will analyse and discuss how capable the current law is of 
protecting and upholding the commercial functions of a trade mark in the face of 
modern consumer habits and technology. 
 
Functions of a trade mark 
The basic function of a trade mark 
According to Bainbridge, in order to find an early definition of a trade mark you 
should look towards s 3 Trade Mark Act 1905. It defined a trade mark as a mark 
used with goods ‘for the purpose of indicating that they are the goods of the 
proprietor of such mark by virtue of manufacture, selection, certification, dealing with 
or offering for sale’.1 
 
This was followed by s 68(1) Trade Marks Act 1938, giving a broader definition of ‘a 
mark used … in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating … a connection in the 
course of trade between the goods and some person having the right … to use the 
mark’.2 
 
At the present time, art 2 of Directive 2008/95/EC3 (the Directive) as implemented in 
s 1(1) Trade Marks Act 1994 (TMA 1994) defines a trade mark as ‘any sign capable 
of being represented graphically which is capable of distinguishing goods or services 
of one undertaking from those of another’.4 
 
It is clear that over time the legislative definition of trade marks has changed with 
each revision of the relevant statutes. Despite this, subsequent iterations contain the 
same common concept: a trade mark helps to identify the origin of goods. 
 
The essential function of a trade mark 
As early as 1927, Schechter identified the various functions of a trade mark. A 
contrast can be made between Schechter’s analysis and more recent case law, 
settling the question of how modern trademarks differ from those of nearly a century 
ago. 
 
Schechter argued that the orthodox purpose of a trade mark is ‘to identify the origin 
or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed’.5 This is the badge of origin concept 
that is enshrined in over a century of legislation from the 1905 Trade Marks Act to 
the Directive, which itself states ‘the function of [a registered trade mark] is in 
particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin’.6 
 
UK courts have referred to the ‘essential function’ of trade marks as in the recent 
case of IPC Media Ltd v Media 10 Ltd.7 Kitchen LJ put forward a trade mark’s 
‘essential function of guaranteeing the identity of the origin of the goods and services 
to which it was applied’.8 
 
In Total Ltd v YouView TV Ltd,9 Sales J noted a trade mark’s ‘indication-of-origin-
function’, citing jurisprudence from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). 
 
The CJEU has ruled on numerous occasions that a trade mark serves as a 
‘guarantee of origin’. In the recent case of Leidseplein Beheer BV v Red Bull 
GmbH,10 the CJEU noted that it was settled case law that the ‘essential function of 
the trade mark … is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services in 
question’.11 
 
Schechter notes both a unifying and differentiating function, stating that trade marks 
show a consumer that ‘two articles, bearing the same mark, emanate from a single 
source’ and, in contrast, a differentiating function, using the case McDowell v 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey).12 This case went to the House of Lords, where 
the issue of contention was whether the trade mark would, as per Viscount Cave LC, 
‘deceive or mislead the trade or the public and … produce confusion between the 
goods [of the] two traders’.13 
 
A differentiating function naturally implies a unifying function. Any function designed 
to differentiate between similar goods of different origins would also act as a unifying 
agent to identify different goods from the same origin. As a logical conclusion, a 
differentiation function must also be part of the ‘essential function’ of a trade mark. 
 
Legislation pays significant attention to the concept of differentiation and prevention 
of confusion of the origin of goods.  
 
Article 16(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), to which the UK is a party, confers: 
the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent 
from using … identical or similar signs … which are identical or similar to [the 
registered trade mark] where such use would result in a likelihood of 
confusion.14 
 
Recital 11 to the Directive offers identical protection.15 Likewise, s 5(2) TMA 1994 
refuses registration of a trade mark where ‘there exists a likelihood of confusion on 
the part of the public’. The same concept also provides protection against 
infringement in s 10 TMA 1994. 
 
The CJEU held in the joined cases of Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und 
Vertriebs GmbH (WSC) v Boots- und Segelzubehör Walter Huber16 that the function 
of a trade mark is ‘to identify an undertaking’s goods and to distinguish them from 
other similar products’.17 
 
The phrase ‘essential function’ implies a base requirement, the idea that a trade 
mark would fail if it were not capable of performing such a function. A trade mark 
acting as a guarantee of origin has been present in over a century of legislation, 
which present-day case law recognises as an essential function. It is clear that 
unless a trade mark is capable, at a minimum, of distinguishing the origin of one set 
of seemingly identical goods from another, it loses a significant amount of purpose. 
 
Further still, this minimum requires recognition from the law in order to fulfil the 
essential function. Without such recognition from the courts, trade mark owners 
would have no redress against fraudsters attempting to create confusion and trick 
consumers by misusing trade marks. 
The true functions of a trade mark 
From the ‘essential function’, other functions can take root and grow. Schechter 
discussed what he believes to be the ‘true functions’ of a trade mark. The first is ‘to 
identify a product as satisfactory’.18 This function serves to guarantee quality. The 
second is to ‘stimulate further purchases by the public’,19 effectively acting with an 
advertising function, an agent for ‘the actual creation and perpetuation of good will’. 
 
The CJEU recognises both of these concepts. Leidseplein shows a recent example, 
with the CJEU stating that the functions of a trade mark include ‘guaranteeing the 
quality of … goods or services or [guaranteeing the quality] of communication, 
investment or advertising’.20 Recognising these functions was a result of continued 
case law, as in Martin Y Paz Diffusion SA v Depuydt21 and many other cases.22 
 
These ‘true functions’ are a logical extension of the ‘essential function’ of a trade 
mark. When each set of goods are marked based on their origin, with no two 
different origins capable of using the same mark, a trade mark becomes an 
ambassador for any given product in the eyes of the public. 
 
Using a trade mark, a company can build up a positive reputation for the quality of 
goods based on their trade mark. Communication of this reputation is a natural 
consequence, and this acts as an agent for the creation of goodwill and, as a result, 
can promote advertising between consumers. 
 
If the ‘essential function’ operates as the roots and branches of the trade mark tree, 
the ‘true functions’ are branches. The branches provide a platform for the leaves of 
goodwill to sprout and provide nourishment to the ‘essential function’, which allows 
the fruits of advertising to flourish. In picking these fruits and sharing their positive 
experience with others, the trade mark tree draws more people to the owner’s 
orchard. 
 
Davis submits an argument on Community trade mark registration, stating that ‘[it] 
was designed to support a system of genuine competition within the EC’.23 
 
It is submitted that this is a combination of all the discussed functions of trade marks. 
It guarantees that marked goods come from a specific origin, often with a known 
quality. Trade marks also differentiate identical products from different origins, 
generating ‘goodwill’ within a given mark and acting as a conduit to advertise where 
a product has sufficient quality attributable to the mark. 
 
Likewise, Schechter’s analysis of trade mark protection in 1927 is still relevant even 
today, citing all the major functions that a modern trade mark possesses. 
 
The limitations of a trade mark 
The introduction of the Trade Marks Act 1994 brought with it excitement and curiosity 
as to how the new definition of a trade mark would allow the registration of previous 
registrable trade marks. Lewin comments that there was potential for registering 
product shapes, smells and even musical jingles.24 Elmslie, stating the general view 
at the time, proposes a counter point that it was ‘… unlikely that a smell could be 
represented graphically so as to distinguish a product …’25 
 
An analysis will be conducted below on the limitations of registering trade marks and 
how these limitations hamper the essential and true functions of a trade mark. 
 
How easy it is to register a trade mark is an important concern. S 31 TMA 1994 
covers trade mark registration, requiring basic paperwork to be completed and an 
application fee to be paid. It is clear that the barrier for entry on the administrative 
side of registering a trade mark is very low, making registered trade marks relatively 
easy to apply for compared to the protections conferred by successful registration. 
 
There is an argument in support of a strong protection being afforded by successfully 
registering trade marks. In Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Cadbury UK Ltd,26 as 
per Sir John Mummery, ‘… the registration of a trade mark creates a form of 
intellectual property conferring a potentially perpetual monopoly in the mark and 
excluding everybody else from use in various ways’.27 
 
Such protection is necessary. If a trade mark acts as the ambassador for any given 
product in the eyes of the purchasing public, to have a situation where someone is 
capable of using that given trade mark without permission of the trade mark owner 
has potential to open the floodgates to foul play, defeating the badge of origin 
function in the process. Were such a monopoly not provided, a trade mark would 
lose a significant amount of worth and thus would be likely to find its purpose 
defeated. 
 
A representation of the trade mark is also required under s 31 TMA 1994, which will 
be discussed below with regard to various unconventional types of trade marks. 
 
Under art 2 of the Directive, as implemented in s 1(1) TMA 1994, a trade mark is 
… any sign capable of being represented graphically which is capable of 
distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings. A trade mark may … consist of words (including personal 
names), designs, letters, numerals or the shape of goods or their packaging. 
 
Anything falling within this description is prima facie capable of registration. 
Additional guidance was provided by the CJEU in Sieckmann v Deutsches Patent 
und Markenamt,28 stating ‘[t]he purpose of graphic representation is to give a clear, 
precise and objective image of the mark’. The Sieckmann definition remains good 
law and will be referred to later. 
 
This is with respect to the absolute and relative grounds as per UK legislation, or the 
grounds and further grounds as per the Directive, for refusal. For example, one of 
the absolute grounds under art 3 of the Directive as implemented in s 3(1)(b) TMA 
1994 is that a trade mark must not be devoid of ‘distinctive character’. Distinctive 
character was discussed in British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd,29 in 
which it was asked whether the mark is ‘the sort of word (or other sign) which cannot 
do the job of distinguishing without first educating the public that it is a trade mark?’30 
 
The approach taken by the CJEU can be seen in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. 
GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV.31 It was held that: 
‘[i]n determining the distinctive character of a mark and … assessing whether 
it is highly distinctive, the national court must make an overall assessment [on 
the] capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services … as coming from a 
particular undertaking, and … to distinguish … goods or services from those 
of other undertakings.’32 
 
Thus, it becomes clear that beyond the limitations within s 1(1) TMA 1994, a wide 
variety of marks are capable of registration, with the remaining grounds for refusal 
existing as practical and procedural requirements, as well as safeguards and 
protections against immoral, illegal or obviously infringing marks being registered. 
 
The main limiting factor is simply the interpretation of the courts, both domestic and 
European, of 
the relevant legislation. 
 
Unconventional trade marks 
A question could be asked regarding the scope of trade marks that are capable of 
registration. An analysis of existing trade marks and case law can provide insight into 
the interpretation of the Trade Marks Act 1994 and the Directive it implements. 
 
Colours can be registered as trade marks. Colour trade marks were the issue in 
contention when a reference was made to the CJEU in Heidelberger Bauchemie 
GmbH.33 It was held that, following Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau,34 
colours ‘may constitute a trade mark’. 
 
However, the recent case of Nestlé v Cadbury35 may change how easy it is to 
register a colour trade mark within the UK, as well as limit the protections afforded to 
existing colour trade marks. In this case, the court held that the colour purple with the 
description provided did not satisfy the s 3(1)(a) TMA 1994 requirement. 
 
Stobbs comments on this technical case, explaining that the term ‘predominant’ with 
regard to the colour being applied to the whole visible surface was not specific 
enough. This effectively failed under the Sieckmann criteria. Stobbs further 
comments that this decision puts existing colour trade marks in contention because 
the ‘… vast majority of the existing protected colour marks are described in the form 
analysed in this case’.36 
 
Despite this, Stobbs argues, ‘… the judgement confirmed that “applied to the whole 
visible surface” would satisfy the requirements …’37 under s 3(1)(a) TMA 1994. 
Stretch also argues that ‘… Cadbury fell short … by using subjective language but 
had they used a more precise description it is likely that the application would have 
succeeded …’38 
 
Other types of trade marks include smells. In Sieckmann an application for a ‘smell 
mark’ was made. This was ultimately rejected by the CJEU, laying down their criteria 
for graphic representation discussed above. The court held that a ‘… chemical 
formula did not represent the odour of a substance …’ and that ‘… a description of 
the odour was not sufficiently clear, precise and objective’. Depositing a sample of 
the odour did not ‘… constitute a graphic representation … [m]oreover, an odour 
sample is not sufficiently stable or durable’.39 
 
A smell would satisfy the requirement of graphic representation if the graphic, in the 
condition it was defined, ‘was and was likely to remain generally accessible for use 
as a benchmark of the specified smell’, as per John Lewis of Hungerford Ltd’s Trade 
Mark Application.40 
 
Wong suggests that it is ‘difficult for olfactory marks to be protected’.41 There exist 
only two registered olfactory marks in the UK, as a testament to this difficulty.42 
These marks are registered simply by text descriptions of their smell and elaboration 
on their basic use. 
 
Sound marks are another potential type of trade mark. The CJEU has recognised 
that sound marks can be protected, giving specific requirements in Shield Mark BV v 
Joost Kist h.o.d.n. Memex.43 A sound is capable of graphic representation where ‘the 
sign is represented by a stave divided into measures and showing … a clef, musical 
notes and rests whose form indicates the relative value and, where necessary, 
accidentals’. 
 
Likewise, slogans were shown as capable of being registered as trade marks, as 
shown in Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Mars UK Ltd44 and Tesco Stores Ltd’s 
Trade Mark Applications.45 Slogans are arguably the most conventional of the 
unconventional trade marks, comprising simply a string of words as opposed to a 
string of letters. It seems a logical conclusion that if one can trade mark a word, one 
can trade mark a phrase or a slogan that is made of multiple words. 
 
Shapes can be registered as trade marks subject to restrictions under art 3(1)(e) of 
the Directive as implemented in s 3(1)(2) TMA 1994. These restrictions serve the 
public interest, as noted in Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer 
Products Ltd,46 ‘that a shape whose essential characteristics perform a technical 
function and were chosen to fulfil that function may be freely used by all’.47 
 
These restrictions are vital. For example, if a company was successful in trade 
marking the standard cylindrical shape of a deodorant canister, it could potentially 
force all other deodorant manufacturers to bottle their products in more expensive or 
less structurally sound containers, conferring a practical advantage to the trade mark 
holder over their competitors. 
 
Bergquist and Curley, analysing the trade marking of shapes in fast-moving 
consumer goods, concluded that ‘only a trace of distinctive character is prima facie 
required for registration of shapes … as trade marks …’, but that ‘[e]ven those that 
are granted may not withstand a validity attack, if challenged’.48 
 
Coca-Cola provides an example of this concept applied in practice. They have 
successfully registered a trade mark for the Coca-Cola bottle’s three-dimensional 
shape.49 This shape serves no practical purpose, nor does it perform any technical 
function. The bottle serves as a unique shape, acting as an ambassador for the 
Coca-Cola brand, even if only in a subtle manner. 
 
Another example of an unconventional trade mark was registered by Asda Stores 
Limited. They successfully trade marked the so-called ‘pocket pat’ gesture in 1995.50 
This remains registered to this day, showing that even a gesture is capable of trade 
mark registration, providing it can be represented graphically. 
 
Significantly more unconventional trade marks are capable of registration. In Apple v 
Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt51 the CJEU held that ‘the representation … of the 
layout of a retail store, may be registered as a trade mark’.52 
 
Blum and Cullen provide commentary on this case. They note the benefits of being 
able to register a store layout as a trade mark, namely that ‘it can make an action for 
trade mark infringement available where otherwise it might be necessary to rely on 
passing off’. This is based on the particular difficulty of establishing the 
misrepresentation required under passing off, mainly owing to potential for a 
defendant’s well-known brand to be on the outside of their store.53 
 
It is submitted that a large number of concepts, both tangible, such as shape or 
colour, and abstract, such as smell or sound, are capable of registration as trade 
marks. As a result, the commercial functions of a trade mark are largely upheld, 
especially in the area of the origin function. This, in turn, enables advertising 
functions, allowing products and brands to be associated with specific sounds, 
songs, colours, shapes, smells, gestures, slogans and even store layouts. 
 
Trade marks and the internet 
On a technological level, internet domain names can also technically be trade 
marked, albeit it in an indirect manner. With regard to Community trade marks, it was 
held in Getty Images v OHIM54 that ‘… the distinctiveness of trade marks composed 
of words and a typographical sign’, such as a domain name, ‘may … be assessed by 
examining each of its terms or elements … but must in any event depend on an 
appraisal of the composite whole’.55 Manning comments that that ‘… it is insufficient 
that internet users use the mark to visit the site on which goods or services are 
offered …’56 
 
Manning concludes that ‘… when it comes to domain names it is not their general 
use but their use as a trade mark that warrants the protection of trade mark law’. 
 
As such, just because a domain name is used in general for any given purpose does 
not necessarily make it capable of being trade marked. The domain name would 
have to be capable of being trade marked in its own right, with no respect paid to its 
use as a domain name. 
 
Within the UK, domain names are not directly capable of registration as trade marks. 
This argument is based on guidance from the Intellectual Property Office, which 
states that ‘[b]eing the owner of a registered trade mark, does not automatically 
entitle you to use that mark as a domain name’.57 
 
The justification for this lies in the fact that ‘… the same trade mark can be registered 
for different goods or services and by different proprietors’.58 This is more of a 
practical problem, as different people may have identical valid trade marks in entirely 
different categories, and deciding who has rights over any given domain name would 
be impractical. 
 
The case of British Telecommunications v One in a Million59 showcases the 
protection afforded to registered trade mark owners with regard to domain names. 
Barker briefly comments on this case, noting that the registration of the domain 
names offered for resale by the defendant ‘… constituted threatened use for the 
purposes of s 10 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 …’60 
 
As submitted by Hart commenting on Tesco Stores Ltd v Elogicom,61 registration 
and use of Tesco-related domain names to reap commission from Tesco as an 
affiliate ‘… would also be regarded as detrimental to the distinctive character or the 
repute of Tesco’s trade marks within the meaning of TMA 1994, s 10(3) …’62 
 
As such, it is submitted that, while domain names are not registered as trade marks, 
an established registered trade mark can successfully be used as a basis to prevent 
others taking advantage of the distinctive character or reputation of that trade mark 
when registering a domain name. While this is primarily to protect the owners of the 
trade mark, it is submitted that this also protects consumers by ensuring that, within 
reason, websites they visit with domain names incorporating elements of existing 
registered trade marks originate from that trade mark holder. 
 
The vessel to reach these potentially infringing sites is more often than not a search 
engine. Search engines are a service that can be used to attempt to locate a website 
without knowing its domain name. In such a scenario, having a domain name 
incorporating another’s trade mark or a website utilising another’s trade marks could 
lead to a web surfer unknowingly visiting a fraudulent website. 
 
There are a series of cases relating to the use of trade marks as adwords in internet 
search engines, starting with Google France v Louis Vuitton,63 where the CJEU ruled 
that search engines themselves are not liable for the use of trade marks as adwords. 
Blythe comments that ‘the advertiser who selected and purchased as an adword the 
keyword corresponding to a registered trade mark’ was the party using the sign in 
the course of trade,64 not the search engine itself. 
 
This was followed by Interflora v Marks & Spencer,65 applying the decision of the 
CJEU in Google France of a new test for whether adword advertising using 
keywords had affected the ability of the trade mark to signal origin, the essential 
function of the trade mark as discussed above. 
 
An implication of consumer protection is present in these decisions. In her analysis 
of the case law surrounding this, Blythe notes that the courts use a hypothetical 
construct of ‘the average consumer, who is reasonably observant and 
circumspect’.66 It is submitted that this construct contains implications that not only 
should the trade mark holder have their rights protected, but the average consumer 
being misled is the trigger mechanism for the trade mark holder’s rights being 
breached. 
 
In Cosmetic Warriors v Amazon67 there were multiple potential grounds for 
infringement similar to Interflora and Google France above. There was also a new 
ground, where searches for ‘Lush’ on the Amazon website, despite Amazon not 
selling any Lush products, did not display a ‘no results found’ message and instead 
automatically directed consumers to alternative products. It was held that the 
argument that the public has a right to access technological developments with 
regard to Amazon’s internal search engine ‘… does not go so far as to allow a trader 
such as Amazon to ride roughshod over intellectual property rights …’68 
 
Still, Blythe concludes that ‘… internet advertising using keywords which are identical 
to trade marks is not an inherently objectionable practice’. A legitimate reason for it 
could be offering users alternatives to goods and services of trade mark proprietors, 
as ‘it is not the purpose of trade marks to protect their proprietors from fair 
competition’.69 
 
In L’Oréal v eBay International,70 a Grand Chamber of the CJEU was called upon to 
answer questions regarding the sale of goods bearing trade marks or Community 
trade marks within the EEA or EU that had not been put on market in the EU. They 
held that ‘[i]t is the task of the national courts to assess … whether relevant factors 
exist … that an offer for sale or an advertisement displayed on an online marketplace 
accessible from the territory covered by the trade mark is targeted at consumers in 
that territory’. When this is true, the trade mark proprietor may prevent the sale or 
offering for sale or advertising of the relevant goods. 
 
They also had to answer a question on the use of keywords that are identical to 
trademarks and have been included in an internet search by an online market place 
operator, holding that the trade mark proprietor can prevent the inclusion of goods 
from appearing in these services. This can occur ‘where the advertising does not 
enable reasonably well informed and observant internet users … to ascertain 
whether the goods … originate from the proprietor of the trade mark’, which is a 
concept also discussed in Cosmetic Warriors. 
 
It is submitted that the existing law takes into account many factors when it comes to 
modern consumer habits such as online shopping, trying to strike a delicate balance 
between competition, the rights of consumers and the rights of trade mark holders. 
Ultimately, the law will always play catch-up as new technological advancements 
progress. The law is in many ways reactive to the developing needs of society, as 
shown in Google France with adwords, L’Oréal with international auctions and 
Cosmetic Warriors with Amazon’s advanced search functionality. 
 
Following the concepts laid out in Cosmetic Warriors, it is clear that the courts are 
trying to strike a balance between the rights of intellectual property holders such as 
those with trade marks and the rights of competitors to offer fair competition online, 
despite interfering with the essential functions of trade marks. 
 
Conclusion 
While certain limitations persist, the broad range of unconventional trade marks 
capable of registration provides ample opportunities to exploit the wide functions that 
trade marks fulfil. The general body of case law suggests that the courts are willing 
to allow a wide variety of marks to be registered that would not otherwise be 
considered conventional. 
 
An idea of where this will lead to in the future can be seen in the suggestion that a 
store layout may be capable of trade mark registration, as per the CJEU in the above 
discussed case of Apple v Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt. Perhaps such 
concepts could lay the foundation for moving or animated trade marks, or trade 
marks for the texture of a material. These concepts are arguably capable of being 
represented graphically without subjective elements. 
 
It is unlikely that any concept as subjective as tastes or scents would be capable of 
registration in the future after Sieckmann ruled out the possibility of using a chemical 
formula. Even a perfectly accurate chemical formula would not adequately describe 
the scent or taste of the mark in question. 
 
While the scope of what is or is not capable of being registered as a trade mark may 
change, the fundamental functions that underpin the entire purpose of such trade 
marks have remained steadfast for a century and look set to continue into the future 
under the vigilant eyes of the courts. This is in contrast to the internet, where the 
courts are constantly playing catch-up. They are called upon to consider the interests 
of trade mark holders and to weigh them against the rapid evolution of mainstream 
technology that is providing new opportunities to businesses and consumers. 
 
As per EU aims, trade mark registration is designed to support a system of genuine 
competition within the EC. As a result, the CJEU has a delicate balancing act 
between preserving the rights of trade mark holders, not stifling competition between 
trade mark holders and protecting the interests of consumers. It is clear that there is 
no easy solution to this problem, as evidenced by the courts applying flexible and 
practical solutions even where they erode the functions of trade marks. 
 
The courts will no doubt remain reactive in the field of technology, as novel ways to 
subvert the functions of a trade mark are developed and then challenged. They will 
continue to be called upon to weigh protecting the functions of trade marks against 
promoting genuine competition while safeguarding the interests of consumers. 
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